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CONSUMER-CREDIT LEGISLATION: LIMITATIONS
ON CONTRACTUAL TERMS
ORRIN L Hasidao*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PLIGHT OF THE BUYER
Early efforts to protect consumers in credit transactions were
mainly directed at eliminating "loan sharks" and inducing legitimate
lenders to enter the small loan market.' To accomplish this program
small loan laws were enacted in almost every state. In recent years,
attention seems to have turned to protecting the indigent consumer
involved in an installment sales transaction.
Studies on the plight of the low-income consumer describe an
individual, usually a wage earner and often at or near the poverty level,
who is lured into a store by clever advertising.' He probably is not
difficult to lure; members of low-income families have been found
particularly susceptible to "compensatory consumption."' Once in
the store, the consumer is subjected to high-pressure salesmanship
and, as a result, is of ten sold a much higher-priced item than the
inferior goods advertised. If the merchandise nevertheless turns out to
be defective or substandard, as sometimes happens, the buyer may have
difficulty trying to recover from the seller. The buyer may discover
that the installment sales contract which he signed has been assigned
to a sales finance company or to a bank which claims ignorance about
the deal between the seller and buyer. In effect, it asserts that it is a
holder in due course, not subject to any of the buyer's defenses against
the seller.
If the buyer refuses to make payments to the assignee when due,
the latter may resort to the remedies available to a creditor when a
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1948; LL.B., University of Wisconsin, 1950; Mem-
ber, Wisconsin Bar; Member, American Bar Association, Dane County Bar Association;
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1 Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 2, 16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Curran].
2 Among such studies are Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (1963); Willging, Install-
ment Credit: A Social Perspective, 15 Catholic U.L. Rev. 45 (1965); Comment, Instal-
ment Sales: Plight of the Low-Income Buyer, 2 Colum. J. Law & Soc. Prob. 1 (1966) ;
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
3 The term "compensatory consumption" has been used to describe a phenomenon
observed by several persons who have studied the buying habits of persons with low in-
comes and with little hope of improving their economic or social status. Such persons have
little chance of breaking out of the hard-core pocket of poverty in which they find
themselves or of moving up the social ladder, so their natural striving for self-respect
and esteem make them eager listeners to the "dollar-down, dollar-a-week" sales pitch,
which in turn causes them to buy goods their income suggests they really cannot afford.
"The car—or television or stereo—helps to compensate for [their] . . . other failures."
Winging, supra note 2, at 52-53. See also Caplovitz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12-13.
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debtor has defaulted.' This usually includes the right to repossess the
goods sold. In fact, the buyer may find that he has given a security
interest in property other than the item sold and that this property is
also subject to seizure. In states where it is legal, the buyer may dis-
cover that he has signed a cognovit note under which he has confessed
judgment and thereby relieved the creditor of the burden of bringing
him into court. Execution may then be levied on the debtor's non-
exempt property, or, more likely, his wages will be garnished to recover
the amount due on the installment sales contract. The latter course of
action may in turn lead to the debtor's discharge from his job due to
his employer's dissatisfaction with an employee who is in such a
financial situation.
It is not suggested that this illustration is representative of the
typical merchant who sells on credit, nor even of the typical consumer.'
Regulatory laws, however, seldom are enacted to control the typical
person or transaction. The illustration is representative of a sufficiently
large number of transactions to have induced action by lawmakers
and others, including those who are preparing the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (hereinafter the Credit Code).
Consumer education and full disclosure of credit information may
be part of the answer to the problem of equalizing the bargaining power
of the parties to the consumer-credit transaction, but at best it would
seem to be a long-range solution.° To effectively equalize this relation-
ship, therefore, the law must step in and remove the parties' control
over some of the items normally left to bargaining. This is the basic
function of the contract-limiting provisions discussed in this article.
In a sense, almost every provision of a consumer-credit law im-
poses some limitation on freedom of contract. Only a few of such
contract-limiting provisions are discussed in this article. Such areas
4 See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Trans-
actions, pp. 555-65 infra.
5 The term "consumer," of course, is broad enough to cover a wide range of per-
sons—the wealthy as well as the poor, the educated as well as the uneducated. It has
been suggested, however, that
problems of poor consumers differ more in degree than in nature from the
problems of the middle-class consumer. [The poor consumers] . . . are more
gullible, more easily cheated, less conscious of quality in the goods they buy,
more likely to over-commit themselves, less likely to deal with middle-class stores
where prices are lower, more likely to deal with high cost neighborhood stores
and peddlers, less aware of credit charges, and less able to understand and assert
their rights than are middle-class consumers.
Report of Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans
and Usury to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 39
(1965).
6 The principal draftsmen of the Credit Code have noted the limitations of dis-
closure legislation. See Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale,
64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1320-22 (1966).
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as limitations on finance charges, requirements as to disclosure of
information, regulation of home-solicitation sales, and licensing of
lenders are not examined. Rather, the focus is on certain provisions
which sometimes are grouped together under the heading of "pro-
hibited contract provisions." These include limitations on the collateral
which may be taken to secure performance, on the size and spacing of
payments, on confession of judgment, on wage assignments, on the
negotiability of notes, and on the waiver of the law's protective
provisions.'
II. RESTRICTIONS ON COLLATERAL
In its restrictions on the type of collateral which may be taken to
secure performance under a consumer-credit transaction, the Second
Tentative Draft of the Credit Code follows the pattern of existing
laws by giving separate treatment to loans on the one hand and sales
of goods or services on the other. This section analyzes these trans-
actions from the standpoint of the type of collateral involved—real
property, consumer goods, and wage assignments.
A. Real Property
The Second Draft permits a seller to contract for a security
interest in real property in connection with a consumer-credit trans-
action only if the sale of goods or services involves maintenance,
repair, or improvement of the buyer's real property and only if the debt
amount is $1,500 or more.' On the other hand, in regulated small
loan transactions (those of $2,500 or less),° the lender is forbidden to
contract for a security interest in real property!' In both transactions,
a security interest taken in violation of the statutory prohibition is
void. In addition, such a violation of the Credit Code might subject
the creditor to forfeiture of his credit service charge or loan finance
charge and also to injunctions and civil monetary penalties;" and a
lender licensed to make "regulated loans" may have his authority
revoked for repeated and willful violations."
7 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1804.1-.3 (West Supp. 1966); Md. Ann. Code art. 83,
§ 130 (1965); Mass. Acts 1966, ch. 284, §§ 10, 15; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, §1 615-16
(Purdon 1965).
8 Credit Code § 2.406. Unless otherwise provided, all Credit Code references arc to
the Second Tentative Draft.
9 A regulated loan is defined in § 3.402 as a consumer loan in which "the amount
financed is no more than [$2,5001" and the rate of the loan finance charge is in excess
of 18% per year calculated on the unpaid balance of the debt. Section 4.201 of the First
Tentative Draft had designated $1,500 to be the dividing line with regard to regulated
consumer loans. In the Second Tentative Draft, the placing of the figure "$2,500" in
brackets seems to indicate doubt as to what this dividing line ought to be.
10 Credit Code § 3.411.
11 Credit Code 1* 5.201(4), 6.105(1), (2).
12 Credit Code § 3.414(1)(b).
521
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The Credit Code's pattern of restrictions on the taking of real
property as security is similar to that of existing laws, insofar as a
pattern can be discerned under those laws. The largest number of
restrictions is found in small loan laws which deal with loans similar
to the Code's "regulated loan." The small loan laws of about half
the states prohibit the taking of security in real property." A few of
the existing installment sales acts also restrict the taking of collateral
to the goods sold and accessions.'
On the whole, the policy of the Credit Code with regard to the
taking of real estate as collateral would seem to be the proper one in
that it prohibits a creditor from clouding the title of the debtor's real
property where only a small credit transaction is involved. The
restrictions are, of course, also designed to prevent overreaching by
creditors in situations usually involving gross inequality of bargaining
power between creditor and debtor and in which deceptive practices
have occurred in the past.
B. Consumer Goods
As a general rule, the Second Tentative Draft provides that a
seller in a consumer-credit sale may take a security interest only in the
goods sold in the transaction and accessions to such goods.' This
general rule, however, is subject to two exceptions. The first is
analogous to the rule discussed above which permits a security interest
to be taken in real property if the sale involves maintenance, repair, or
improvement of that property. Thus, in the case of personal property,
if the debt is more than a certain amount (undetermined in the Second
Draft), the seller may take a security interest in the personal prop-
erty maintained, repaired, or improved, even though such personal
property itself was not sold in the transaction."' The second exception
relates to add-on sales and cross collateral. The Credit Code permits
a seller of goods to secure the debt arising from the present sale by
contracting for a security interest in goods he previously sold to the
buyer if either the seller or a transferee holds an existing security
interest in them." Goods sold in a subsequent sale also may be made
security for a debt owing under a previous sale.
Such security interest in goods previously or subsequently sold
apparently may be contracted for even though the installment con-
tracts and payments thereunder are not consolidated. If, however,
13 See Curran 40 & n.237.
14 See id. at 108 & n.220.
15 Credit Code § 2.406.
10 Ibid.
17 Credit Code § 2.407. In this section the reference to "transferee" is bracketed,
apparently indicating doubt as to whether the rule permitting cross collateral should
apply when the chattel paper from the previous sale has been transferred.
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the debts arising from two or more consumer-credit sales are consoli-
dated into one debt payable on a single schedule, section 2.408 provides
the standard formula for determining when specific collateral is
released!' This section states that payments received by the creditor
are "deemed to have been applied to payment of the debts arising
from the various sales in the same proportion as the original debts
arising from these sales bear to one another."
This pro-rating formula applies only to payments made after
the consolidation of the contracts, not to payments made prior thereto.
Thus, if a buyer purchases a refrigerator for $200, arranging monthly
payments of $20, and six months later buys a television set for $300,
the consolidated payments are $25 per month; the security interest
in the refrigerator would be released first, because $10 of the $25
monthly payments would be allocated to the refrigerator. Even so,
this formula is not as favorable to the buyer as the one used in the new
Massachusetts law. Under that formula, the entire $25 payment each
month would be allocated to the refrigerator for the purpose of
determining when the security interest in the refrigerator is released!'
Comparing these provisions with similar provisions in existing
laws, one finds that only the "all goods" installment sales laws of
California, Connecticut, Delaware, and Massachusetts contain any
restrictions on the taking of personal property as collateral?' They
generally prohibit the taking of a lien on goods already paid for or
not previously sold by the seller. The new Massachusetts law goes
further and provides that a security interest may not be taken in goods
previously sold by the seller unless there is a consolidation of the in-
stallment contracts.' Eight of the existing motor vehicle installment
sales laws limit the taking of a security interest to the motor vehicle
sold or accessions thereto.'"
18 See statement by Professor William D. Warren, Reporter-Draftsman for the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 11 (Aug. 4, 1966).
is) Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 18B (Supp. 1966) provides that "payments
made under the consolidated agreement shall be applied toward the unpaid amounts in
the order of the purchase of the goods or services."
Both the Credit Code and the Massachusetts law would preclude the type of practice
held unconscionable in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). The contractual provision in that case stated that "all payments now and
hereafter made by [purchaser] ... shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases,
bills and accounts" due the seller at the time each payment is made. Id. at 447. (Italics
omitted.) The effect of this provision was to keep a balance due on every item purchased
until the balance due on all items had been paid, and thus to maintain the seller's
security interest in all items that the buyer purchased from him, past or future.
20 See Curran 312-22 (chart 19, col. 15), which lists all but the Massachusetts act
which was enacted in 1966. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, §§ 15, 18 (Supp. 1966).
21 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 15(c) (Supp. 1966),
22 Those states are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, and North Dakota. Curran 312-22 (chart 19, col. 16).
523
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Although the Credit Code limits the taking of security interests
in personal property in connection with consumer sales, the Second
Tentative Draft imposes no restrictions on the taking of such security
interests in consumer loans. In this respect, it follows the general
pattern of existing law; a lien on household goods is only rarely pro-
hibited by existing small loan laws.' One of the reasons for dis-
tinguishing lenders from sellers may be that the former have tradition-
ally been more closely supervised by various state regulatory agencies
than have sellers. This supervision would continue under the proposed
Credit Code."
It should be noted that several existing small loan laws, although
not prohibiting security in personal property, require the signature
of both the borrower and his spouse on any instrument creating a
security interest in household goods." It is doubtful whether this
requirement has provided significant protection against imprudent
borrowing or overreaching lenders, and it has not been incorporated
into the Credit Code.
C. Wage Assignments
The Second Tentative Draft absolutely prohibits a seller from
taking an assignment of earnings of the debtor as security for payment
of a debt arising out of a consumer-credit sale.' There is no such
prohibition against a wage assignment in connection with a consumer-
loan transaction, although the drafters did restrict any assignment to
that part of a debtor's earnings which exceeds $100 in any calendar
week." For the purpose of determining a debtor's weekly earnings,
amounts encumbered by garnishment or like proceedings or by other
irrevocable assignments are to be excluded. The purpose is to safe-
guard at least $100 of the debtor's earnings on the theory that the
debtor is entitled to a living wage free from the claims of his creditors.
A similar restriction is imposed on wage garnishments.'"
Unlike the sections which restrict the taking of security interests
in real property and tangible personal property, the sections restricting
wage assignments do not state specifically that the prohibited assign-
ments are void.' Such an assignment, however, would of course be
23 Id. at 41.
24 Lenders wishing to make regulated loans (loans of $2,500 or less on which the
interest rate exceeds 18% per year) would have to have "authority" from the state
regulatory agency. See Credit Code §§ 3.403, .412, .413. The proposed Code imposes no
similar licensing requirement for installment sellers.
25 Curran 41-42.
28 Credit Code § 2.409.
27 Credit Code § 3.106.
28 Credit Code § 5.103.
29 See Credit Code §§ 2.409, 3.106.
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unenforceable,30
 and a seller or lender who takes such an assignment
would violate the Code and presumably subject himself to the in-
junctive and monetary sanctions of section 6.105.
Wage assignments are presently regulated in almost every state,
but the exact degree of regulation varies widely.' The state regulations
may be found in small loan laws, in installment sales laws, in general
laws relating to wage assignments, and sometimes in all three"—all
of which would have to be reconciled with a uniform consumer-credit
law. Most states which permit wage assignments under their small
loan laws follow the Uniform Small Loan Law by requiring that the
assignment be in writing, signed by the spouse, and executed at the time
the loan proceeds are delivered to the borrower."
In the early thirties, a study was conducted on the burdens
which wage assignments imposed upon the low-income debtor.' It
was common practice at that time for employees to assign their wages
as security for payment of consumer loans and installment sales
contracts. If the employee defaulted in his payments, the lender or
seller would threaten to file the assignment with the debtor's employer.
Of course, the mere threat to file, which was carried out if the debtor
remained in default, constituted enormous pressure on the debtor in
view of the general attitude of employers to disfavor wage assignments.
The policy of many employers was to discharge an employee when
three wage assignments had been filed against him. Although this
discharge policy was not uniformly followed, nevertheless the employee
was often subjected to other abuses. For example, an employer who
must routinely handle a large number of assignments often enforces
the invalid along with the valid ones.'
It is not known whether employers disfavor wage assignments
today to the same extent that they did thirty years ago. There has
probably been little change, since the extra clerical work involved
continues to be an expense and a nuisance." Since wage assignments
often represent a threat to an employee's job, a provision which
prohibits or limits them in consumer-credit transactions is laudable."
3° Sec Restatement, Contracts §§ 580, 598 (1932).
31 Thirty-four states have general laws on the subject of wage assignments. See
Curran 342-47.
32 See id. at 40-42, 108, 128-29, 342-47 (chart 22). The laws vary from outright
prohibition of wage assignments to a mere requirement that they be made in writing.
33 Id. at 42.
34 See Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago—State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour
& Co., 42 Yale L.J. 526 (1933).
33 Id. at 536-38.
311 Wage assignments, however, would seem to be somewhat less onerous than gar-
nishments since the former do not require court appearances.
37 If wage assignments are not to be absolutely prohibited in such transactions, it
makes sense to provide for the same kind of exemption as is provided with regard to
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Of course, a broad wage exemption policy may mean that credit will
not be available in some instances where it might otherwise have been
granted, but these probably are instances in which credit should not
be extended at all. An alternative to absolute prohibition of wage
assignments in connection with consumer-credit sales might be to per-
mit them only if the employer consents to the assignment at the time
it is made. Such a provision, however, still ought to be coupled with a
limited monetary exemption in order to insure a minimum living wage.
III. RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO PAYMENT
A. Balloon Payments
Section 2.405 of the Second Tentative Draft states that when
"a consumer credit sale is payable in instalments no instalments
contracted for may be substantially greater than any preceding
instalment, except that the last instalment may be as much as twice
the average of the preceding payments." An exception is allowed "if
the payment schedule is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income
of the buyer or to acommodate the nature of the buyer's employment
such as acquiring goods from his employer for use in demonstrating or
selling similar products." Regulation is necessary in this area since the
"balloon payment"—an abnormally high payment generally due at the
end of the contract period—has been subject to abuse. Its use allows
the creditor to quote unusually small installment payments, leaving
the debtor with a final payment so large that it may force him to
default.
There are, of course, legitimate uses for balloon payments, such
as in the case of the seasonal worker with uneven income. The nature
of certain kinds of employment also calls for valid uses of balloon
payments. An example of the latter is the automobile salesman who
buys a demonstrator under a balloon-payment contract with the
anticipation of selling the car and making the large payment at the
end of the model year.
A balloon-payment provision similar to that on sales applies to
regulated loans under the Credit Code. Section 3.410 states that if
such a loan "is payable in instalments no instalment may be more than
twice as large as the average of all other instalments." Presumably,
both sections relate to installments "contracted for," even though
section 3.410 does not explicitly so state. Unlike section 2.405 on
sales, there is no exception in section 3.410 for seasonal or irregular
employment of the borrower. It is unclear whether the draftsmen
thought such an exception unnecessary in the case of small loans or
garnishments. For an excellent exposition of the problems stemming from wage garnish-
ments, see Erunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
Calif. L. Rev. 1214 (1965).
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whether the different phraseology of section 3.410 will permit sufficient
flexibility to take care of any adjustments that the nature of the
employment might warrant. As an example of such flexibility, section
3.410 would seem to permit some large payments if the other pay-
ments were proportionately small, and large payments would not
necessarily have to come at the end of the payment period.
Prohibitions of or restrictions on balloon payments are fairly
common in existing consumer-credit laws. Many states have adopted
the Uniform Small Loan Law's provision that installments must be
payable at approximately equal intervals of time and that no install-
ment shall be substantially greater in amount than the preceding
installment. Most of these laws, however, make no exceptions for
special employment situations." Some of the existing installment
sales acts also prohibit balloon payments, but others contain special
provisions which differ from those in the proposed Credit Code. Under
a few of these acts, the installment buyer is entitled to have his
payments rescheduled if he defaults on a payment which is two or
more times the average amount of all the installments. Under two acts,
the seller may arrange for balloon payments but is limited to a charge
of six per cent per annum on such payments, a restriction which tends
to discourage their use."
The new Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales Act provides
that the amount of the installments must be substantially equal,
except for the down-payment. Moreover, the intervals between in-
stallments must be substantially equal. An exception to these require-
ments is made if the buyer is given an absolute right upon default in
any "excess or irregular installments" to have the schedule of unpaid
installments revised to conform both in amount and intervals to the
average of all preceding installments and intervals." Like the Credit
Code, the Massachusetts law also contains an exception for the buyer
who has an uneven seasonal income, but, unlike the Code, Massachu-
setts does not attempt to accommodate the nature of the buyer's em-
ployment.
The relatively flexible balloon-payment provisions of the Credit
Code probably provide somewhat less protection to consumers than
some of the more rigid restrictions in existing consumer-credit laws.
It should also be noted that the proposed Credit Code guarantees the
right of the debtor to pay the debt in full prior to maturity,' so that
in a sense a debtor can voluntarily make a balloon payment even
38 See Curran 31 n.133.
33 See id. at 106.
40 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 10(3) (Supp. 1966).
41 Credit Code §§ 2.401, 3.105, .407.
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though the contract does not provide for it.' This may eliminate
some of the need for special exceptions to the general prohibition
against contractual provisions for balloon payments.
B. Acceleration Clauses
Another contractual provision which may be subject to the same
kind of abuse found in the balloon payment is a provision giving the
creditor the right to accelerate payments at will or whenever he deems
himself insecure. Apparently, therefore, a number of existing retail
installment sales acts prohibit provisions which permit the creditor
arbitrarily to accelerate any part or all of the amounts owing. Some
would permit such acceleration only upon the debtor's default.'
Unfortunately, there is no similar prohibition in the Second Tentative
Draft. The Code ought to include a provision which would prohibit
a contractual clause permitting the seller or lender to accelerate pay-
ments other than upon the debtor's substantial default. Although an
unrestricted acceleration clause would probably be held void," the
matter should not be left to judicial determination.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE REMEDIES OF THE SELLER AND
HIS ASSIGNEE
A. Unconscionable Contractual Provisions
To what extent should consumer-credit legislation prohibit
specific unconscionable contract clauses? For example, is it necessary
for the statute to contain a specific prohibition against clauses whereby
the buyer waives benefits which the law provides, or agrees not to
assert a claim against the creditor for the illegal repossession of property
or the illegal collection of accounts? Some existing installment sales
laws do contain such prohibitions.' Although there are no similar
prohibitions in the Second Tentative Draft, courts would still very
likely refuse to enforce such clauses since they are so inconsistent with
the general public policy behind consumer-credit laws. Nevertheless,
it would seem desirable to prohibit them expressly so as to remove any
doubt of their illegality.
The Second Tentative Draft does, however, move in this direction
by the insertion of a general unconscionability section. Like the
42 A few existing laws (notably the small loan laws) have also been concerned about
unduly extending the payment schedule and hence have placed limits on it. Curran 32.
A similar limitation has been included in the Second Tentative Draft with regard to the
length of terms of "regulated loans." No such restriction, however, has been placed on
the schedule of payments under consumer-credit sales.
43 Id. at 312-22 (chart 19, cols. 4, 5).
44 See U.C.C. § 1-208, Comment.
45 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §1 1804.1(d)-(i) (West Supp. 1966); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law
§ 403(3) (d)-(g) (McKinney 1962). Sec Curran 107-08.
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Uniform Commercial Code, the Draft authorizes a court to refuse to
enforce a contract or any clause which it finds as a matter of law to be
unconscionable at the time the contract was made." Note that since
the Uniform Commercial Code is directed only at contracts for the
sale of goods," enactment of the Credit Code would have the effect
of extending the unconscionability rationale to contracts involving the
sale of services.
The problem of defining unconscionability is acute. One court said
that it involves an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties and the presence of contractual terms which are unreason-
ably favorable to the other party." Gross inequality of bargaining
power, together with lack of reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract due to lack of education or deceptive sales
practices, is indicative of the absence of meaningful choice. Reason-
ableness or fairness are difficult to determine, but will generally depend
on whether the terms are so extreme as to appear outrageous according
to the mores and business practices of the time and place of the con-
tract's formation.
It is submitted that in a regulatory law designed to protect the
weaker party to a commercial transaction, the function of a flexible
concept such as unconscionability should be to buttress the specific
regulatory provisions of the law rather than to substitute for them.
From the buyer's standpoint, the ability to point to specific rules
which control the seller in the exercise of his remedies, or which
control other practices which commonly lend themselves to abuse, is
important. From the seller's or financing agency's standpoint, it
should be equally important that the borderline between lawful and
unlawful conduct is spelled out to the greatest degree practicable.
B. Confession of Judgment
Although most states have passed laws dealing with cognovit
clauses, the manner of treatment varies greatly. Seven states specifi-
cally allow them to be used, but some of these states limit or even
prohibit their use in certain consumer-credit transactions. Twenty-
three states, while allowing a confession of judgment, place various
procedural limitations on it. Finally, and most drastically, fifteen
states make cognovit clauses void."
The Uniform Small Loan Law contains a provision stating that
"no licensee shall . . . take any confession of judgment or any power
46 Credit Code § 2.411.
47 See U.C.C. §§ 2-102, -302.
48 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., supra note 19.
49 Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111, 126-27 (1961).
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of attorney running to himself or to any third person to confess
judgment or to appear for the borrower in a judicial proceeding.'
This or a similar provision has been incorporated into the small loan
laws of most states." In addition, some of the existing installment
sales laws contain a provision prohibiting the creditor from taking a
power of attorney to confess judgment.' There is no comparable
provision in the Second Tentative Draft of the Credit Code.
In 1961, a survey on the use of cognovit clauses was conducted
among lawyers and executives of sales finance companies, small loan
companies, banks, and trade associations." It appeared from this
study that the finance industry is sharply divided on the use of
cognovit judgments." Most of the persons contacted implied that
cognovit judgments were rarely taken in the case of small consumer
loans. However, a survey of cases in the Municipal Court of Chicago
for 1960 showed that there were 45,402 suits on confession of judgment
out of a total of 193,191 suits filed that year." Most of the. finance
companies which did not use cognovit clauses appeared to have been
concerned with two factors: (1) the ill will resulting from public
reaction to the clause, and (2) the inherent unfairness of the judgment
procedure involved. Those who defended the cognovit clause presented
two basic arguments: (1) the clause provides justice to the lender
who needs a quick and cheap lien against a debtor whose only excuse
for nonpayment is inability or unwillingness; and (2) the clause
does not overpower the debtor since judges liberally vacate a confession
judgment whenever the debtor alleges any defense, no matter how
weak. With reference to the latter argument, it should be noted that
there probably are not many defendants who obtain a lawyer and
avail themselves of the opportunity to reopen the judgment's
On the basis of this survey, it was concluded that there are at
best limited arguments in favor of the use of cognovit clauses in any
type of credit instrument, and that the finance industry itself would
not object too strenuously to complete abolition." In addition, an
increasingly substantial hostility to the use of cognovit judgments was
noted among state legislatures and high courts.' To the extent that
this report accurately reflects contemporary thinking, it would seem
appropriate to incorporate into the Credit Code a prohibition on the
5° Curran 154.
51 Id. at 41.
52 Id. at 108, 312-22 (chart 19, col. 6).
53 Hopson, supra note 49, at 114.
54 Id. at 117.
55 Id. at 119.
5° Id. at 119-22.
57 Id. at 125.
58 Id. at 131.
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use of cognovit clauses in instruments relating to consumer-credit
transactions.
C. Debtor's Waiver of Defenses Against Creditor's Assignee
The buyer often must contend with a sales finance company or
bank which, as the assignee of the installment sale contract, asserts
that it is not subject to any of the buyer's defenses against the seller-
assignor, i.e., that it is a "holder in due course." This problem has led
a number of states to incorporate into their installment sales laws
a provision prohibiting clauses by which the buyer agrees not to
assert against an assignee any claims or defenses which the buyer might
have against the orginal seller. In addition, some of these laws re-
strict the use of negotiable notes in connection with installment sales
contracts or restrict the negotiability of notes which are used." It
does little good to prohibit a waiver of defenses in the installment sale
contract if the defenses may be waived by the buyer giving the seller
a negotiable note which may be negotiated to a holder in due course.
Conversely, it does little good to prohibit use of negotiable notes in
connection with installment sales if, in effect, negotiability may be
imparted to the sales contract by a waiver clause effective to cut off
the buyer's defenses.
The Second Tentative Draft properly recognizes the need for
restrictions both on the transfer by the seller of the credit-sale con-
tract and on the use of negotiable promissory notes. Section 2.404
renders ineffective a clause in the sales contract by which the buyer
waives any defenses against the seller's transferee which he may
have had against the seller." Unlike similar provisions in some
existing laws, there is no prohibition against inserting the clause itself
in the contract. This omission may seem unimportant, but it may be
desirable to make it a violation of the Credit Code to include unen-
forceable clauses in a contract. It is conceivable that the mere presence
of such unenforceable clauses may have an in terrorem effect and
59 See Curran 108, 312-22 (chart 19, cols. I, 3). Restrictions on the "holder-in-due-
course" status of a financing company may be the result of the often close relationship
between transferor and transferee. See Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered by
Consumer-Credit Legislation, pp.466-69 supra. Among the many other recent commentaries
which have discussed this issue are the following: Jones, Finance Companies as Holders
in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 177; Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev.
389, 394-402 (1960); Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 782 (1954). In addition, there is an
extensive annotation in 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
69 That section provides:
Except as provided in section 2.403, with respect to a consumer credit
sale a transferee of the seller's rights is subject to all claims and defenses of the
buyer against the seller arising out of the sale notwithstanding an agreement
to the contrary, but the transferee's liability may not exceed the amount of the
debt at the time the transferee acquires his rights.
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consequently may deter buyers from pursuing remedies which are
available to them.
Section 2.403 prohibits a seller in a consumer-credit sale from
accepting a promissory note payable to order or bearer as evidence of
the obligation of the debtor. However, if the seller violates this pro-
vision and takes a negotiable note, he may nevertheless negotiate it to
a holder in due course who may then enforce it according to its terms.
An unscrupulous seller, therefore, could nullify the buyer's statutory
protection simply by violating the Code's mandate not to accept a
negotiable note from the buyer. It is exactly this kind of seller against
whom the buyer most needs protection. Therefore, a better provision
would be to make a holder of a "negotiable" note, given in connection
with a consumer-credit sale, subject to the claims and defenses which
the buyer might have asserted against the original seller. By avoiding
a statutory declaration that the note is nonnegotiable, certain pro-
cedural advantages of holders of negotiable instruments could be
preserved," while at the same time subjecting the holders to substan-
tive defenses which the maker might have claimed against the seller.
The basic policy problem is one of balancing the interest of the
commercial community in the unrestricted negotiability of commercial
paper against the interest of installment buyers in the availability of
their normal remedy of withholding payment when defective merchan-
dise has been sold to them. Some existing installment credit laws
attempt to balance these interests by providing that assignees of
consumer sales contracts and transferees of notes take subject to
defenses which the buyer might have against the seller, but that they
may free themselves from such defenses by following a specific
procedure." This procedure generally requires sending to the buyer a
fairly complete statement of the transaction involving the transfer. If
this statement is not correct, or if the buyer has some claim or defense
against the seller, he must so notify the assignee from whom he
received the notice. He is generally given only ten or fifteen days in
which to make the reply. If he does not notify the assignee of a claim
or defense within that period, he is barred from subsequently raising
it. The Second Tentative Draft does not provide for such a procedure,
but the comment which was appended to section 6.102 of the First
Tentative Draft indicates that some thought had been given to it at
one time. The comment noted that experience has shown that a period
of ten or fifteen days may be too short, and that a period of at least
thirty days may be desirable. It is submitted that even a thirty-day
61 See U.C.C. § 3-307.
62 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1004.3 (West 1954) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403
(McKinney 1962).
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period may be too short a time in which to discover latent defects in the
goods purchased.
Like existing consumer-credit laws, the Second Tentative Draft
does not attempt to bar the use of negotiable notes in consumer-loan
transactions, as distinguished from consumer sales. There may be a
number of valid reasons for this distinction, among the more im-
portant of which is that the problem of defective or undelivered
merchandise is not present in the case of consumer loans.
Perhaps the basic question here is whether the buyer or the
financial institution which purchases the seller's paper should bear
the risk of an unethical or insolvent seller. Where one of two equally
"innocent" persons must suffer a loss, the loss should be placed on the
person best able to bear it. The financial institution, through use of its
investigative facilities, or through recourse agreements and dealer
reserves, is much better equipped than the buyer to avoid the risk,
or to avoid any loss. Furthermore, the institution can pass the loss on
to others in the form of increased credit costs.'
V. CONCLUSION
Anyone attempting to evaluate the contract-limiting provisions of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code might do well to consider some
of the points made by the committee assigned the task of drafting it.
In its 1965 report to the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the committee noted that since consumer-credit legislation
is aimed at protecting the consumer, it is fair to ask from what pre-
cisely is the consumer to be protected.
Must he be protected from his own lack of knowledge or
discipline which leads him to take advantage of easy credit
to buy things he does not need or cannot afford? Is he to be
protected from the "fringe" operator who may take advantage
of the ignorance and gullibility of the consumer to cause him
to overbuy or to pay too much? . . . [Or rather should
attention] be focused on making the credit market more
63 There is some evidence that the barring of waiver clauses or negotiable notes
in consumer-credit transactions does not present any great problem to financers. Thus,
it has been said that Pennsylvania bankers experienced no trouble with the pre-1957
version of U.C.C. § 9-206 which made assignees of installment sales contracts or holders
of negotiable notes subject to defenses which a buyer of consumer goods might have
asserted against the seller. Felix, Experience with Dealer and Consumer Financing Under
the U.C.C., 73 Banking L.J. 229, 233 (1956). It also has been said that a 1943 decision
of the New Mexico Supreme Court holding the financer subject to the buyer's defenses
did not materially affect sales financing in that state. The only real difference between
pre- and post-1943 financing in New Mexico was that the financing institutions of the
state required the retailer to establish a larger reserve to take care of possible warranty
defenses." Vernon, Priorities, the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financing,
4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 531, 547 (1963).
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perfectly competitive by, among other things, requiring full
disclosure of credit terms on a uniform basis to the extent
that such disclosure is feasible, by educating consumers for
more intelligent use of credit, and by putting the credit
grantor and the consumer on a more equal bargaining
basis [?j 04
It seems clear, as the committee noted, that consumer education and
full disclosure of credit information is not enough, and that what is
needed is a balanced approach designed to encourage the use of
legitimate sources of credit while ridding the credit industry of the
harmful practices of the minority.° 5
One aspect of this balanced approach is the limitation imposed
by statutory provisions on the right of the parties to bargain freely
on the terms of the credit transaction. An attempt has been made in
this article to examine critically some of these provisions of the pro-
posed Credit Code, particularly in comparision with similar provisions
in existing legislation. The objective was to focus attention on this
area of consumer-credit legislation in the hope that further considera-
tion might be given to some of the problems raised. It seems clear that
the Code, when enacted, will substantially improve consumer pro-
tection in most states, and that it will do so without impairing the
important social and economic functions which consumer credit serves.
61 Report of Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
9 (1965).
65 Id. at 10.
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